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CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS FROM FEDERAL APPELLATE
COURTS TO THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT AND ITS
IMPACT ON THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINE
STANTON S. KAPLAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
When a cause of action is tried before the federal judiciary, and the
jurisdiction is predicated upon diversity of citizenship, the federal forum is
required to apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits.' The
determination of what the state law is, or should be, in relation to resolving
the issues before the court will be made by the federal court itself. This
is true no matter how ambiguous or vague the state law may seem to be.
The federal court must ascertain what the state law is even though the
state courts have never decided the matter.2
The United States Supreme Court has developed, and often applied,
a doctrine of "abstention," whereby, in certain cases before the federal
courts, the actions are suspended while the litigants seek state court
determination of the uncertain state law questions involved. But what
approach is used by the parties in seeking the answers to these questions,
and exactly what type of situation calls for the application of "abstention"?
Does not this procedure lead to delay and expense?
In 1945, the Florida Legislature, "with rare foresight,"3 adopted a
procedure whereby the Supreme Court of Florida could answer questions
of Florida law through the use of certified questions sent to it by any
federal appellate court.4 This procedure was never used by the federal
judiciary until 1960, when it was applied in Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd.5
Is this statute constitutional? And why did the federal courts procrastinate
in its use? Does it not seem improper for the federal courts to give up
their jurisdiction and thereby deprive the parties of the federal adjudication
to which they are entitled under congressional mandate?6 This writer will
discuss these and many other inquiries relating to this general area.
* B.B.A., 1959, LL.B., 1962, University of Miami; written while Associate Editor
of the University of Miami Law Review.
1. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d
754 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940).
2. Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949); Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335
U.S. 701 (1949); Williams v. Green Bay & W.R.R., 326 U.S. 549 (1946); Markham v.
Allen, 326 U.S. 490 (1946); Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228 (1943); Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
3. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 212 (1960).
4. See text accompanying note 85 infra.
5. 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958).
414 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
II. DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The federal courts are conferred diversity of citizenship jurisdiction by
title 28 of the United States Code. Section 1332 sets forth that:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or sub-
jects thereof; and
(3) citizens of different States and in which foreign states
or citizens or subjects thereof are additional parties.
Swift v. Tyson
Section 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789
provided that:
[T]he laws of the several states, except where the constitution,
treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common
law in the courts of the United States in cases where they applyJ
In 1842, the United States Supreme Court decided, the landmark case
of Swift v. Tyson," which ruled diversity jurisdiction cases in the federal
courts for nearly a century. The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Story, held that when the federal courts exercise jurisdiction based
upon diversity of citizenship, the courts are not required to apply the
unwritten (common) law of the state as declared by its highest court. The
federal courts had a free rein in determining what the common law of the
state was - or should have been." The Court, in construing the Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789, held that section 34 was limited in its application
to the positive statutes of the state and the interpretations of these
statutes by the local tribunals.' 0 The true intent of the act was thought
not to extend to "general principles and doctrines of commercial
jurisprudence."'"
The application of the doctrine expounded by Swift v. Tyson revealed
its many defects. Congress conferred diversity of citizenship jurisdiction
upon the federal courts to prevent discrimination in state courts against
those litigants not citizens of the state and to create uniformity of law
7. 1 Stat. 92 (1789). (Emphasis added.)
8. 16 Pet. 1 (1842).
9. Id. at 18.
10. Ibid.
11. Id. at 19.
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throughout the United States. However, the Swift doctrine created the
converse, in that it allowed discrimination by non-citizens against parties
who were citizens of the state. The rights which accrued to the people
under the common law of the state varied according to whether the parties
sought enforcement in the state or in the federal court. The non-citizen
was conferred with the privilege of selection. Equal protection of the law
was, therefore, unattainable under the Swift doctrine. The state courts
prevented uniformity by their persistence in answering questions of state
common law contrary to federal decisions. The federal courts found it
impossible to draw a satisfactory line of demarcation between the province
of state common law and state decisions interpreting state statutes. The
Swift doctrine, in attempting to promote greater uniformity of law through-
out the courts of the United States, had prevented it.12
The Erie Era
The interpretation of the Federal Judiciary Act presented in Swift v.
Tyson, which had governed for 96 years, was reversed in 1938 by Erie R.R.
v, Tompkins."3 Mr. Justice Brandeis, making one of his last great contri-
butions to American jurisprudence, stated that "there is no federal general
common law."14 When a case is not governed by the United States Consti-
tution or by congressional enactments, the law applicable in all cases is
the law of the state. "[W]hether the law of the State shall be declared by
its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a
matter of federal concern."' 5
The Erie-case placed a greater responsibility upon the federal courts,
in diversity cases, to determine and apply state law. The problem of
ascertaining state law may often be a difficult one. However, that is insuf-
ficient grounds for a federal court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction.
Chief Justice Marshall, in Cohens v. Virginia,16 stated that:
It is most true, that this court will not take jurisdiction if it should
not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction, if it should.
The judiciary cannot . . . avoid a measure, because it approaches
the confines of the Constitution .... With whatever doubts, with
whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if
it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is
not given. The one or the other would be treason to the
Constitution. 17
12. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
13. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
14. Id. at 78.
15. Ibid.
16. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
17. Id. at 404.
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Thus, cases are legion in which the federal courts, attempting not to
thwart the purpose of the jurisdictional act, have decided questions of state
law even though the answers were difficult,"' and the highest court of the
state had not previously answered these questions.'!' The United States
Supreme Court is hesitant to overrule decisions by lower federal courts
when they have determined the law of particular states, unless their conclu-
sions are shown to be unreasonable.
2 0
III. THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINE
In the last two decades the United States Supreme Court has developed,
and frequently applied, a doctrine of "abstention" from the exercise of its
jurisdiction. This enables a state court to resolve some, or all of the issues
involved in a particular diversity action.
The Supreme Court created the abstention doctrine in Railroad
Connm'n v. Pullnan Co.,2' in 1941. There an administrative order based
upon a doubtful interpretation of a state statute was challenged as unauthor-
ized by state law and as violative of the due process, equal protection, and
commerce clauses of the federal constitution. Speaking through Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, the Court unanimously adopted the abstention procedure and
remanded the case to the district court with directions to retain jurisdiction
pending a determination of the state law questions. The Pullman case
established the first of two classes of cases in which abstention is required.
The first class consists of suits brought for equitable relief against state
action in which a state interpretation of uncertain state law may avoid a
federal constitutional issue as to the validity of the state action. This
principle serves the policy of comity inherent in the doctrine of abstention
and furthers the Supreme Court's policy of avoiding premature determina-
tions of constitutional questions.22  The federal district court does not
abdicate federal jurisdiction in these cases, but only postpones its exercise
while the state court answers the issues of state law.2a
18. The latest decision of the highest court of the state, on the question of law
involved in the federal court, must be taken as controlling unless some substantial assurance
is given that the highest court will not follow that decision in the future. Meredith v.
\Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
19. Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949); Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335
U.S. 701 (1949); Williams v. Green Bay & W.R.R., 326 U.S. 549 (1946); Markham v.
Allen, 326 U.S. 490 (1946); Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
20. Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949); Estate of Spiegel v. Comnissioner, 335
U.S. 701 (1949); Hlelvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942); Maccregor v. State Mut. Life
Assur. Co., 315 U.S. 280 (1942).
21. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
22. Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944): Siler v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909).
23. Harrison v. N.A.A.C.P., 360 U.S. 167 (1959); Louisiana P. & L. Co. v. City of
Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358
U.S. 639 (1959); Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm. CIO v. Wind-
sor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957); Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957);
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As for the interpretation of "uncertainty" in relation to state law,
the Supreme Court has held that the federal courts should not adjudicate
the constitutionality of state enactments fairly open to interpretation until
the state courts have been afforded a reasonable opportunity to pass on
them.2 4 Thus far, a more precise standard as to the degree of uncertainty
has not been formulated.
Abstention is required in a second class of cases when a decision by
the federal courts would involve a determination of state domestic policy
or would be an unnecessary interference with the action of state regulatory
activities at the administrative stage.25 Vhether or not substantial consti-
tutional issues or questions of federal law are raised in these cases, and
regardless of the settled or unsettled condition of the applicable state law,
the abstention doctrine will be applied. The basis for this application is
the avoidance of federal-state friction, a problem besetting a system of dual
government.
In Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,20 the first of two leading cases involving
state administrative action, the federal district court enjoined the enforce-
ment of an order of the Texas Railroad Commission. This order was issued
under a state program to regulate oil and gas production through the
spacing of oil wells, and by proration of oil production quotas among indi-
vidual oil fields and wells within the state. The Supreme Court reversed
and held that the district court was required to abstain in this situation.
The Court did not discuss the avoidance of a constitutional question and
placed only a minimal reliance upon the uncertainty of the state law involved.
The Court, instead, discussed the effect of federal equitable interference
upon the state's regulatory scheme, and the difficulties in evaluating the
Commission's order. It was concluded that intervention by the federal
judiciary in these circumstances would result in conflicts in the interpre-
tation of state law which would endanger the success of state policies.2 7
In the second leading case, Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern
Ry.,2 8 the plaintiff railroad petitioned the Commission to authorize the
discontinuance of two local passenger trains that were being operated at a
loss. The request was denied, and the plaintiff brought an action in the
federal district court, alleging that the decision of the Commission was
Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242 (1953); AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946);
Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944); Chicago v. Fieldcrest
Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168 (1942); Williams v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 293 F.2d 835
(D.C. Cir. 1961).
24. Harrison v. N.A.A.C.P., 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
25. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
26. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
27. Id. at 334.
1. 28. 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
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tantamount to confiscation of the railroad's property and therefore violated
the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution. The district court
enjoined the enforcement of the Commission's order. On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the complaint. The
Pullman case was held inapplicable because the Alabama case did not involve
the interpretation of a state statute. 2"1 However, the Court stated that when
an administrative order, based predominantly upon local factors, is afforded
adequate review by a state court, federal intervention is unnecessary to
protect federal rights. In order to preserve the rightful independence of
state government, the Court denied federal equitable relief.
Despite emphasis to the contrary in Burford, that decision can prob-
ably be supported under the Pullman rule.,30 However, in the Alabama case,
the Supreme Court made no reference to issues of state law.' Since no
state law issues were involved, abstention could not resolve the uncertainties
in state law, nor avoid a federal constitutional question. Taking cognizance
of the rationale and indications in the opinion,32 it must be considered
that, in Alabama, abstention was granted solely for the purpose of avoiding
federal-state friction.
The principle of comity set forth in Alabama left the- scope of the
abstention doctrine in a confused state.A'  Subsequent cases manifest that
the Alabama rule is limited to causes of action which challenge state admin-
istrative action, typically the action of a regulatory commission.A4
In this second class of suits in which abstention has been applied, the
federal courts have been required to dismiss the action without retaining
jurisdiction.a 'f Congress has acted in this area by amending the Judicial Code
to provide that if a "plain, speedy and efficient" remedy is available in a
state court, the federal courts are powerless to enjoin the enforcement of any
order of a state rate-making body "affecting rates chargeable by a public
29. Ibid.
30. Burford contained a federal constitutional question and an issue of uncertain
state law. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317, 331 (1943).
31. It must be assumed that no state law issues were involved in the Alabama case.
32. "Considering that '[flew public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion
of a federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction with state policies,' the usual
rule of comity must govern the exercise of equitable jurisdiction by the District Court
in this case." Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern.Ry., 341 U.S. 341. 350 (1951).
33. The concurring Justice in Alabama thought that the principle applied to any suit
in a federal court attacking any action of a state agency. Id. at 362.
34. Harrison v. N.A.A.C.P., 360 U.S. 167 (1959); City of Meridian v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639 (1959); City of Chicago v. Atchison T. & S.F.R.R.,
357 U.S. 77 (1958); Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242 (1953); Wreiole v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 132 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
35. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951); Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v.
Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
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utility,"3 and the courts cannot enjoin the "assessment, levy or collection of
any tax under state law" by state taxing authorities.3 7
Temporary Arrest of the Abstention Doctrine
The case of Meredith v. Winter Haven3 temporarily halted the erosion
of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction in the federal courts. In Meredith,
non-citizen bondholders sought to enjoin the city's redemption of municipal
bonds without providing for the payment of deferred interest coupons.
The suit was brought in the federal district court based solely on diversity
of citizenship. The district court held for the plaintiffs. The court of
appeals set aside the injunction that had been granted below, and held that
the cause of action should be dismissed without prejudice.-" ' The court
of appeals rationalized that a decision of the case on the merits would be
based upon Florida constitutional and statutory law, and since state deci-
sions construing these enactments had left the law in a state of uncertainty,
the decision should be that of the Florida courts. The Supreme Court
of the United States reviewed and synthesized its prior decisions relating to
abstention and reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that
the difficulties of ascertaining state law did not afford sufficient grounds for
the denial of federal forum jurisdiction, despite the fact that the remedy
sought was an injunction against state action.4 0
Expansion of the Abstention Doctrine
After Meredith, no new limitation on the exercise of diversity of citizen-
ship jurisdiction was sanctioned by the Supreme Court until 1959. Until
that year, the scope of the abstention doctrine had been limited to the
two classes of cases already mentioned. However, in June 1959, the Supreme
Court decided four cases 41 which manifested an extension and support of
abstention.
In Martin v. Creasy42 the federal district court had stayed the action
in order to allow the Pennsylvania courts to determine whether Pennsyl-
vania law provided for damages when the state had limited the plaintiff's
right of access to a road. The plaintiff contended that the state law was
violative of the federal constitution due to the failure by the state to
provide just compensation. The district court reopened the case, as the
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1958).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1958).
38. 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
39. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 134 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1943).
40. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
41. Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959); County of Allegheny v. Mashuda Co.,
360 U.S. 185 (1959); Harrison v. N.A.A.C.P., 360 U.S. 167 (1959); Louisiana P. & I
Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
42. 360 U.S. 219 (1959).
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state courts failed to render a definitive answer, and held that the state
statute was unconstitutional.43  The Supreme Court, in reversing the dis-
trict court's decision, invoked the abstention doctrine. 44 Mr. Justice Stewart
stated that it was desirable to avoid federal-state conflicts, the unnecessary
impairment of state functions and premature constitutional questions. 45
Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Chief Justice varren joined, concurred. 46
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented, remarking that an adjudication by the federal
forum in this case would not be intermeddling in state affairs and would
not create needless friction.
47
In County of Allegheny v. Mashuda Co.,48 the county had allegedly
condemned land, but not for a public purpose. Due to the fact that this
cause of action was already being litigated in the state courts, the federal
district court held that the case could be resolved in the state proceedings,
and the case was dismissed.4 11 This decision was reversed by the court of
appeals, ' ° and the Supreme Court affirmed. 5' Mr. Justice Brennan stated
that there was no federal constitutional problem involved, the state law
in issue was clear and well settled, and the case turned on the purely factual
question of whether or not the taking was for private rather than public
use.5
The appellees in Harrison v. N.A.A.C.P.r3 brought suit in the federal
district court praying for a declaratory judgment that five Virginia statutes,
never before interpreted by the state courts, were violative of the federal
constitution. The district court stayed the action until the state courts
had an opportunity to construe two of the statutes which were held to be
ambiguous. The remaining three statutes were held unconstitutional, and
their enforcement was enjoined.54
Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court,
said that all the Virginia statutes required state court construction before
43. Creasy v. Stephens, 160 F. Supp. 404 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
44. Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959).
45. Id. at 224.
46. These Justices relied especially on the desirability of avoiding constitutional ques-
tions and interference with the state highway program at its inception. Id. at 225-26.
47. Mr. Justice Douglas believed that the question of whether or not access rights
constitute "property" in the constitutional sense did not concern local law, but concerned
solely the Bill of Rights. "It is an authoritative pronouncement at the beginning of a
controversy which saves countless days in the slow, painful, and costly litigation of separate
individual lawsuits in state viewers proceedings." Id.. at 229.
48. 360 U.S. 185 (1959).
49. The district court held that it "should not interfere with the administration of
the affairs of a political subdivision acting under color of State law in a condemnation
proceeding." Frank Mashuda Co. v. County of Allegheny, 154 F. Supp. 628, 629 (W.D.
Pa. 1957).
50. Frank Mashuda Co. v. County of Allegheny, 256 F.2d 241 (3d Cir. 1958).
51. County of Allegheny v. Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959).
52. Id. at 196. Justices Clark, Black, Frankfurter and Harlan dissented.
53. 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
54. N.A.A.C.P. v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Va. 1958).
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the Court could resolve the issue of their constitutionality. In invoking
abstention, he stated that the abstention procedure is essential to suppress
federal-state friction. 55  "This principle does not, of course, involve the
abdication of federal jurisdiction, but only the postponement of its exercise;
it serves the policy of comity inherent in the doctrine of abstention, and it
spares the federal courts of unnecessary constitutional adjudication. '56
Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice
Brennan concurred, dissented. Speaking about the abstention doctrine,
he stated:
[T]he Pullman case has been greatly expanded. It has indeed been
extended so far as to make the presence in federal court litigation
of a state law question a convenient excuse for requiring the federal
court to hold its hand while a second litigation is undertaken in the
state court. This is a delaying tactic that may involve years of
time and that inevitably doubles the cost of litigation. When used
widespread, it dilutes the stature of the Federal District Courts,
making them secondary tribunals in the administration of justice
under the Federal Constitution. . . . From the time when Con-
gress first implemented the Fourteenth Amendment by the ...
Civil Rights Act of 1871 the thought has prevailed that the federal
courts are the unique tribunals which are to be utilized to preserve
the civil rights of the people .... Where state laws make such an
assault as these do on our decisions and a State has spoken defi-
antly against the constitutional rights of citizens, reasons for
showing deference to local institutions vanish. 57
The most revolutionary of the cases was Louisiana P. & L. Co. v. City
of Thibodaux.58 There the utility company removed to the federal district
court an expropriation proceeding filed against it by the city in the Louisiana
courts. The statute, which purportedly authorized the seizure, had been
interpreted in an opinion by the Attorney General of Louisiana, wherein
he advised that the city's action was unauthorized. The district court
stayed the proceedings until the Louisiana Supreme Court had been afforded
an opportunity to construe the ambiguous statute.59 The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed.60 The Supreme Court reversed the decision
of the court of appeals and held that the district court had properly exer-
cised its power in granting abstention."'
55. Harrison v. N.A.A.C.P., 360 U.S. 167, 176 (1959).
56. Id. at 177. This writer believes that this statement relates only to cases involving
federal constitutional questions. In the second class of cases a dismissal is required.
57. Id. at 180, 182.
58. 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
59. City of Thibodaux v. Louisiana P. & L. Co., 153 F. Supp. 515 (E.D. La. 1957).
60. The court of appeals held that abstention was not available in an eminent domain
proceeding, and no exceptional circumstances were present to justify abstention even if it
was available. City of Thibodaux v. Louisiana P. & L. Co., 255 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1958).
61. Mr. Justice Frankfurter distinguished Meredith v. Winter Haven, contending that
1962]
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority, stated that eminent
domain is intimately involved with sovereign prerogative.62  "And when, as
here, a city's power to condemn is challenged, a further aspect of sovereignty
is introduced."6 3  Determining the extent of the delegation of eminent
domain powers deals with the apportionment of governmental powers
between city and state. This issue turns on the variation of local legislation
interpreted in local settings.64 The rationale behind the rule of abstention
is similarly appropriate in a state eminent domain proceeding brought before
the federal judiciary.
6 5
There is only postponement of decision for its best fruition.
Eventually the District Court will award compensation if the taking
is sustained. If for some reason a declaratory judgment is not
promptly sought from the state courts and obtained within a reason-
able time, the District Court, having retained complete control of
the litigation, will doubtless assert it to decide also the question
of the meaning of the state statute.
66
Mr. Justice Stewart concurred, stating that although both the Thibo-
daux and Mashuda cases dealt with eminent domain proceedings, the former
case is totally unlike the latter. In Mashuda, the Supreme Court denied
the dismissal of the complaint, holding that since the state law was clear
and only factual issues needed to be resolved, prompt adjudication was
called for in the federal forum.
6 7
Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice
Douglas joined, vigorously dissented, contending that the abstention doctrine
is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of the federal courts
to render prompt justice in cases properly before them on the grounds of
diversity jurisdiction."" The Justices argued that this case did not come
the issue in Meredith was whether jurisdiction must be surrendered to the state court.
"Here the issue is whether an experienced district judge, especially conversant with Louisiana
law, who, when troubled with the construction which Louisiana courts may give to a Lou-
isiana statute, himself initiates the taking of appropriate measures for securing construction
of this doubtful and unsettled statute . . . . should be jurisdictionally disabled from seeking
the controlling light of the Louisiana Supreme Court." Louisiana P. & L. Co. v. City of
Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27 n.2 (1959).
62. He relied on a quotation by Mr. Justice Holmes in Madisonville Traction Co. v.
St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239, 257 (1905), wherein Mr. Justice Holmes stated:
"The fundamental fact is that eminent domain is a prerogative of the State, which ...
may be exercised in any way that the State thinks fit, and . . . may not be exercised
except by an authority which the State confers." Louisiana P. & L. Co. v. City of
Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 26 (1959).
63. Louisiana P. & L. Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959). (Empha-
sis added.)
64. See Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168 (1942), wherein the issue
touched upon was the relationship of city to state. The proceeding was stayed.
65. Louisiana P. & L. Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959).
66. Id. at 29. (Emphasis added.)
67. Id. at 31.
68. Id. at 32.
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within the realm of the two recognized situations in which abstention is
justified. 69  Not even the "slightest hazard of friction" 70 in federal-state
relations was presented in this case. The party seeking an interpretation
of authority was the city itself. "This case does not involve the potential
friction that results when a federal court applies paramount federal law to
strike down state action.,"
71
The Court ignores cases in which this Court has refused to refer
state law questions to state courts even though that course required
a federal constitutional decision which resulted in affirmative pro-
hibitions against the State from carrying out sovereign activities.
Surely, eminent domain is no more mystically involved with "sov-
ereign prerogative" than a city's power to license motor vehicles,...
a state's power to regulate fishing in its waters, . . . its power to
regulate intrastate trucking rates .... 72
Mr. Justice Brennan, in trying to rationalize the majority holding,
raised an interesting point as a possible explanation for it.73  He stated
that this decision "reflects a distaste for diversity jurisdiction." 74  However,
the federal judiciary has only one choice, and that is to adjudicate cases
involving diversity jurisdiction until Congress removes its mandate. 75
Prior to Thibodaux, all cases involving the application of the abstention
doctrine were suits in equity. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in overcoming that
contention, stated that in those cases the federal courts "did not apply a
technical rule of equity procedure. They reflect a deeper policy derived
from our federalism."7 6
The Court apparently is willing to grant a "stay" in a diversity case
when the circumstances involve any aspect of the sovereign prerogative
77
if the applicable state law is uncertain.78  To this extent, a third area of
exceptional circumstances in which the federal courts will allow the appli-
cation of the doctrine is established. However, since the degree of uncer-
tainty needed to bring about abstention is unclear, that result would greatly
69. Id. at 33.
70. Ibid.
71. Id. at 35.
72. Id. at 37.
73. Mr. Justice Brennan contended that the Court should frankly state that Meredith
is overruled as that case is in point and the Court makes no adequate distinction between
the cases. Id. at 38.
74. Id. at 41.
75. Ibid.
76. Id. at 28.
77. Any suit in which state action is challenged seems to involve a matter close to
the political interest of a state and it may be difficult to avoid the holding of Thibodaux.
78. The Thibodaux majority might approve remission in all diversity cases, even those
between private parties, if the relevant issue of state law is open to interpretation. See
Louisiana P. & L. Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27 n.2 (1959); Sutton v. Leib,
342 U.S. 402, 412 (1952) (Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring).
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aggravate federal-state friction, which the abstention doctrine seeks to avoid.
The federal court will be the one which will decide whether to "stay" the
proceeding or adjudicate the matter itself. This creates a great deal of
confusion and uncertainty.
Problems of Abstention
While Mr. Justice Frankfurter is the greatest advocate of the absten-
tion doctrine, Mr. Justice Douglas is the most vehement opponent of its
use.79 The opposition reasons that the federal judiciary has no authority
to limit the right of adjudication in a federal court when Congress has
set forth that privilege. By opposing all abstention, there would be some
degree of consistency. Even though there is a possibility of different results
in subsequent causes of action before the state courts, at least the federal
courts would handle all diversity cases themselves.
One of the great problems of the doctrine is its "want of definition."
The federal district court, in deciding whether or not to apply abstention,
has difficulty in determining what view the Supreme Court will take on
appeal. It is highly desirable that Congress amend the Judicial Code and
set forth a standard for the federal district courts to follow. This action
would also erase the main objection to the doctrine, i.e., the lack of
congressional authorization.
The greatest burden created by the abstention doctrine is the matter
of delay.80 In cases in which the circumstances possibly call for the appli-
cation of the doctrine, whether or not abstention is applied by the federal
district court, the parties may have the right to appeal the determination
of the abstention issue to the court of appeals and possibly to the Supreme
Court. This is the first point of delay.
Even if no appeal is taken and a stay or dismissal is granted, the burden
is now upon the litigants to bring the cause of action before the state courts.
If the suit is dismissed, the parties must start in a state court having original
jurisdiction.
If the suit is stayed, the parties must obtain a decision on the substan-
tive issues from the highest state court. Some states provide a method of
review by means of a declaratory judgment proceeding,8 1 while others have
no direct method available to secure an adjudication from the highest court of
79. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Brennan are strong supporters of Mr.
Justice Douglas.
80. For a good example of delay due to application of the abstention doctrine, see
Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944).
81. Some states provide for a direct petition to the highest court of the state for a




the state. In, the latter situation, the parties must bring their action in a
state court having original jurisdiction and work their way up to the highest
court.
Innumerable problems under this form of abstention can be foreseen.
For instance, should the plaintiff seek the answers to the state law ques-
tions only, or should he also seek a determination of the federal law issues?
May the federal judiciary prohibit the determination of federal law issues
by the state courts, or does the state have a constitutional obligation to
answer the federal questions? Suppose the plaintiff fails to raise federal
issues, but the state court answers these questions. Can the plaintiff re-
litigate the federal questions upon returning to the federal court system?
What of the doctrine of res judicata in relation to state court determination
of federal issues? All of these questions are beyond the scope of this article
and have already been discussed adequately.8 2
The delay and expense for litigants may deter taking advantage of the
choice of forums which Congress has provided.8 3 Also, a financially strong
party may be able to control the choice of forum. He deliberately may
choose a federal adjudication in a case reasonably certain to be sent back
to the state court. In this way, he may force his adversary to settle or
decline to bring suit.
IV. THE AWAKENING
Probably the best way to avoid unreasonable delay and expense is
through a procedure set forth by the Florida Legislature, whereby the
Supreme Court of Florida is authorized to receive and answer certified
questions of uncertain state law from federal appellate courts. This author-
ization was originally granted by the legislature in 1945,4 and later became
section 25.031 of the Florida Statutes. This section provides:
The supreme court of this state may, by rule of court, provide
that, when it shall appear to the supreme court of the United
States, to any circuit court of appeals of the United States, or to
the court of appeals of the District of Columbia, that there are
involved in any proceeding before it questions or propositions of
the laws of this state, which are determinative of the said cause.,
and there are no clear controlling precedents in the decisions of
the supreme court of this state, such federal appellate court may
certify such questions or propositions of the laws of this state to the
supreme court of this state for instructions concerning such ques-
tions or propositions of state law, which certificate the supreme
court of this state, by written opinion, may answer. 85
82. Comment, Consequences of Abstention by a Federal Court, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1358 (1960).
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958).
84. Fla. Laws 1945, ch. 23098, § 1, at 1291.
85. FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
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The Constitutionality of Section 25.031
Since section 25.031 is the first statute of its kind in the United States,
it must be determined whether the statute is a valid and constitutional
enactment.
"State constitutions are in no manner grants of power, as is the federal
constitution, but are limitations upon the powers of the state legislature. 8"
Any power which is not limited by a state constitution will inhere in the
people of that state.8 7 This being the case, unless it can be shown that
the Florida constitution expressly or impliedly prohibits the enactment of
section 25.031, the legislative provision will be valid.8
The Florida constitution does not specifically prohibit the Florida
Legislature from granting the supreme court the power to render advice to
federal appellate courts on questions of "uncertain" Florida law, when
the answers are needed to resolve a case before the federal judiciary. Since
there is no express prohibition against the enactment of section 25.031, a
constitutional implication prohibiting the authorization of the statute must
be found, in order to invalidate it.
Section 4 of article V of the Florida constitution delineates the appellate
jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court. It also sets forth certain named
writs which the court may issue. Should section 4 be construed as restricting
the Florida Legislature from expressly enlarging the judicial powers of the
Supreme Court of Florida? This question has been answered in the
negative.
89
Each department of government has "the inherent right to accomplish
all objects naturally within the orbit of that department," if it is not
expressly granted to another department or expressly limited by the
constitution."
86. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So.2d 735, 741 (Fla. 1961); accord, In re
Board of Pub. Instruction, 76 So.2d 863, 864 (Fla. 1955); Thomas v. State, 58 So.2d
173, 177 (Fla. 1952); Miami Beach v. Crandon, 160 Fla. 439, 444, 35 So.2d 285, 287
(1948); Shad v. De Witt, 158 Fla. 27, 29, 27 So.2d 517, 519 (1946); Fowler v.
Turner, 157 Fla. 529, 534, 26 So.2d 792, 799 (1946); Taylor v. Dorsey, 155 Fla.
305, 314, 19 So.2d 876, 881 (1944); State v. Pearson, 153 Fla. 314, 318, 14 So.2d 565,
567 (1943); 11 Am. JUR. Constitutional Law § 18 (1937); 6 FLA. JuR. Constitutional Law
§ 37 (1956).
87. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, supra note 86, at 741.
88. Miami Beach v. Crandon, 160 Fla. 439, 35 So.2d 285 (1948); State v. Pearson,
153 Fla. 314, 14 So.2d 565 (1943); South Aft. S.S. Co. v. Tutson, 139 Fla. 405, 190 So.
675 (1939); Savage v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 101 Fla. 1362, 133 So. 341 (1931);
Harry E. Prettyman, Inc. v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 92 Fla. 515, 109 So. 442 (1926);
Chapman v. Reddick, 41 Fla. 120, 25 So. 673 (1899).
89. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So.2d 735, 740-43 (Fla. 1961).
90. Id. at 742; accord, Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1949);
In re Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63 S.W.2d 672 (1933); In re Integration of Nebraska State
Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W. 265 (1937).
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The Supreme Court of Florida has consistently held that, although
the Florida Legislature cannot in any way reduce the jurisdiction of the
supreme court when that power has been conferred by the Florida consti-
tution, the constitutional jurisdiction can be enlarged by the legislature
if this expansion does not diminish the constitutional jurisdiction of another
court and the constitution does not prohibit the expansion.91
Since there is no constitutional provision which either expresses or
implies that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida is limited to
express grants of power conferred upon it by the constitution; and taking
into consideration the lack of an express constitutional provision conferring
the jurisdictional power, which is the subject matter of section 25.031,
upon another court; and reiterating the rule that all sovereign power not
limited by a state constitution inheres in the people of that state, it must
be concluded that section 25.031 is a valid exercise of legislative authority.9 2
V. CLAY V. SUN INSURANCE
For nearly fifteen years after the advent of section 25.031, the federal
appellate courts ignored it. Then, in 1960, the United States Supreme Court,
in Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd.,93 for the first time implied that the court
of appeals should take advantage of the convenient procedure set forth
by section 25.031.
In Clay the petitioner, while a citizen and resident of Illinois, pur-
chased from respondent insurance company a "Personal Property Floater
Policy (World Wide)," which provided for world wide coverage against
"all risks" of loss or damage to the chattels covered. The policy required
that suit must be brought within twelve months after the discovery of any
loss. After moving to Florida, the petitioner sustained losses in 1955. The
respondent denied liability, and in 1957 the petitioner brought suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.94
The two main contentions of the respondent were: (1) that the suit
was barred by the Illinois statute of limitations; and (2) that the "all risk"
coverage was not applicable to losses resulting from the appropriation of
the property by the insured's wife. The district court decided in -favor of
the petitioner, holding that the interference by the spouse did not preclude
coverage and that, based upon section 95.0391 of the Florida Statutes, the
91. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So.2d 735, 742 (Fla. 1961); accord, Pournelle
v. Baxter, 142 Fla. 517, 195 So. 163 (1940); South Atl. S.S. Co. v. Tutson, 139 Fla. 405,
190 So. 675 (1939); Chapman-v. Reddick, 41 Fla. 120, 25 So. 673 (1899).
92. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, supra note 91, at 742-43.
93. 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
94. The jurisdiction was based upon diversity of citizenship.
95. FLA. STAT. § 95.03 (1961). "All provisions and stipulations contained in any
contract whatever . . . fixing the period of time in which suits may be instituted under any
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"suit clause" was invalid. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed, holding that section 95.03 did not apply to the Illinois-made con-
tract, as the application would be violative of due process. 0 However,
the court did not consider the state law question - whether section 95.03
in fact applies to the type of contract involved in this case. The only
question decided was the constitutional one, which would be ripe only if
the statute actually did apply.
The United States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, held that the court of appeals should have preliminarily
answered the two nonconstitutional questions, namely, the effect of the
interference by the spouse and whether section 95.03 applied to this contract,
before deciding the constitutional issue. "The Court of Appeals was . . .
not called upon . . . to reach this constitutional question; nor is this
Court."'U Since these answers might avoid a constitutional question, the
Court vacated the judgment and remanded the cause to the court of appeals,
implying that section 25.031 of the Florida Statutes be made use of in
order to receive a clear interpretation of the uncertain state law involved.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that:
The Florida Legislature, with rare foresight, has dealt with the
problem of authoritatively determining unresolved state law involved
in federal litigation by a statute which permits a federal court to
certify such a doubtful question of state law to the Supreme Court
of Florida for its decision. s
However, it was indicated that even without this revolutionary advent
of the Florida Legislature, the questions would have to be resolved by the
Supreme Court of Florida since it is the policy of the United States Supreme
Court to render federal constitutional questions moot. 9
Mr. Justice Black, with whom Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice
Douglas joined, dissented vigorously. He remarked that the state law
questions in this instance were not ambiguous or vague, 00 nor was the
answer to the constitutional question unclear.' 0 ' He proceeded to answer all
three questions. The first question related to the loss of property caused
by the intervention of the wife. Since the policy insured against "all risks,"
such contract . . . at a period of time less than that provided by the statute of limitations
of this state, are hereby declared . . . to be illegal and void. No court in this state shall
give effect to any provision or stipulation of the character mentioned in this section." FLA.
STAT. § 95.11(3) (1961) provides a five-year limitation for actions on written contracts
not under seal.
96. Sun Ins. Office Ltd. v. Clay, 265 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1959).
97. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 211 (1960).
98. Id. at 212.
99. Ibid.
100. Id. at 213.
101. Id. at 214.
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and the instrument did not intimate any exception relating to the inter-
ference of a spouse, it was considered unlikely that the contention that the
policy did not cover the loss would be sustained anywhere.'0 2  As to the
issue of the "suit clause," "the only way to get ambiguity into this, section
is to import it."'1° Similar statutes exist in thirty-two other jurisdictions,
04
and state courts have consistently applied those statutes to make use of the
underlying legislative intent.'", He further stated that added support is shown
by the fact that the Attorney General of the State of Florida had filed
briefs and orally argued in support of the petitioner. The statute should
have been given its plain meaning and the Court should have settled the
constitutional question before it.'0 ,
The dissenters, after remarking that this situation called for the answer
of the constitutional question' 0 7 proceeded to uphold the constitutionality
of the Florida law, rationalizing that Florida, the forum .state, had sufficient
contact with the parties and was not compelled to apply the law of the
state where the contract was made.'08
Mr. Justice Black set forth the proposition that the practice of avoiding
the decision of constitutional questions is not a rigid rule, but is discre-
tionary with the Court. To make it rigid would be "bad for the litigants,
bad for the courts, and bad for the country."10  He further stated that:
Litigants have a right to have their lawsuits decided without
unreasonable and unnecessary delay or expense." 0 There come
times .. .when a constitutional question is so ripe for decision,
when its resolution is so much needed, that it would be proper to
decide the constitutional question even though there might be a
possibility or even a probability that by sending a case back some
nonconstitutional question might be decided in a way that would
remove the constitutional controversy from that particular case."'
Turning to the problem of the use of certified questions to obtain a
decision from the Supreme Court of Florida, Mr. Justice Black stated that
102. Ibid.
103. Id. at 215.
104. See CARNAHAN, CONFLICT OF LAWS AND LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 25(h),
at 121 n.83, and § 137 (1958).
105. Ehrenzweig, Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 973, 1000
(1959)
10. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 216 (1960).
107. The rationale behind this view was that the answer would have an important
effect on the laws of many states. Id. at 225.
108. Id. at 221-22.
109. Id. at 224.
110. "This case was begun in 1957. The damage was sustained in late 1954 and early
1955. It has taken over a year to have this Court rule on the decision of the Circuit Court
below. Remand, some form of transfer of part or all of the case to the state courts,
proceedings there and either appeal to this Court again or return to the federal system and
eventually return here, might possibly even take 10 years or more." Id. at 224 n.20.
111. Id. at 224.
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"Florida does have such a law on paper, but evidently does not have one
in fact." 1 2  He argued that the Supreme Court of Florida had never
promulgated any rules of court under section 25.031 and had never accepted
any certified questions."1
Upon remand of the Clay case, the court of appeals utilized section
25.031 for the first time by sending the two nonconstitutional questions to
the Supreme Court of Florida by the method of certification.
The Supreme Court of Florida, although never having provided the
rules of court for this procedure, accepted the certified questions and in
October 1961, rendered a decision answering them.'
1 4
Only recently has the Supreme Court of Florida supplied the procedural
rules needed by the federal appellate courts in order to insure the proper
use of section 25.031. These rules are set forth in section 4.61 of the
Florida Appellate Rules.11 5
VI. PROBLEMS OF CERTIFICATION
There are many problems raised by inter-sovereign certification. First
it seems odd that the Florida Legislature restricted certification to the
federal appellate courts. Is it not true that the federal district court is
given the first opportunity to determine whether the case before it is ripe for
application of the abstention doctrine? If a district court determines that
a case before it requires the application of abstention, how does it go about
seeking the advice of the Supreme Court of Florida? It seems illogical to
say that when a district court applies abstention, the parties must first seek
112. Id. at 226.
113. Ibid. Mr. Justice Black felt that this was probably due to the fact that state
courts 'do not like to decide cases on a piecemeal basis.
114. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1961). In answering both
questions, the court favored the insured.
115. FLA. App. R. 4.61. Certified Questions From Federal Courts.
a. When Certified. When it shall appear to the Supreme Court of the United
States, or to any of the Courts of Appeal of the United States that there are involved in
any proceeding before it questions or propositions of law of this State which are determina-
tive of said cause and that there are no clear controlling precedents in the decision of the
Supreme Court of this State, such federal appellate court may certify such questions o&
propositions of law of this State to the Supreme Court of Florida for instructions concerning
such questions or propositions of state law.
"b. Jurisdiction. Questions or propositions of law referred to in sub-paragraph a.
hereof shall be certified for answer to the Supreme Court of this State."c. Method of Invoking Rule. The provisions of this rule may be invoked by any of
the federal courts referred to in sub-paragraph a. hereof upon its own motion or upon the
suggestion or motion of any interested party when approved by such federal courts.
"d. Contents of Certificate. The certificate provided for herein shall contain the style
of the case, a statement of the facts showing the nature of the cause and the circumstances
out of which the questions or propositions of law arise and the question of law to be
answered."e. Preparation of Certificate. The certificate may be prepared by stipulation or as
directed by such federal court. When prepared and signed by the presiding judge of said
federal court, it shall be certified to the Supreme Court by the clerk of the federal court
and under its official seal. The Supreme Court may, in its discretion, require the original
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an interpretation of the pertinent state law involved from a lower Florida
court,1 16 while this same determination can be made through the use of
certified questions sent directly to the Supreme Court of Florida, when the
case is before a federal appellate court. In order to avoid delay, the district
court would have to fail to apply abstention when the case called for its
application, and leave it up to the federal appellate court to make use of
section 25.031. The appellate court would first reverse the district court's
decision and then certify the pertinent questions to the Supreme Court of
Florida.
If Congress has a high regard for the use of section 25.031, and if it
realizes the dilemma of the federal district court, it might authorize a proced-
ure whereby the federal district court would be allowed to certify pertinent
questions of state law to the court of appeals. The appellate court, in turn,
could certify those questions to the Supreme Court of Florida. The best
solution, however, would be for the Florida Legislature to give the privilege
of certification not only to the federal appellate courts, but also to the
federal district courts.
The method of certification itself can be criticized. It has been
contended that in framing a question of such an abstract quality, there
is a great propensity toward shading the answer.117 An even greater objec-
tion is raised to the abstract or academic answer to a question which is void
of any factual surroundings. These and many other objections to the use of
certification have been shown through the hostile attitude of the United
States Supreme Court toward answering this type of question. 118
Another question to be answered is whether the objection to the
abstention doctrine relating to the unauthorized relinquishment of federal
jurisdiction is a valid one. It seems that, in those cases which are dismissed
by the federal courts, there is an unauthorized relinquishment of federal
or copies of all or any portion of the record before the federal court to be filed with said
certificate where, in its opinion, such record may be necessary in the determination of said
cause."f. Costs of Certificate. The costs of the certificate and filing fee shall be equally
divided between the parties unless otherwise ordered by this court."g. Briefs and Argument. The appellant or moving party in the federal court shall
file and serve upon its adversary its brief on the question certified within thirty days after
the filing of said certificate in the appellate court of this State having jurisdiction. The
appellee or responding party in the federal court shall file and serve upon its adversarv its
brief within twenty days after receipt of appellant's or moving party's brief and a reply brief
shall be filed within ten days thereafter.
"h. Oral Argument. Oral argument may be granted upon application and, unless for
good cause shown the time be enlarged by special order of the Court prior to the hearing
thereon, the parties shall be allowed the same time as in other causes on the merits."
11'6. In this situation the parties must work their way up to the Supreme Court of
Florida.
117. Comment, Inter-Sovereign Certification as an Answer to the Abstention Problem.
21 LA. L. REV. 777, 781 (1961).
118. Moore & Vestal, Present and Potential Role of Certification in Federal Appellate
Procedure, 35 VA. L. REV. 1 (1949).
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jurisdiction. When a case is stayed, the federal forum retains jurisdiction,
and there is only a postponement of decision. 1 " The use of abstention in
the "stay" situation does not defeat diversity jurisdiction. In dealing with
section 25.031, the federal forum parts with no jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court of Florida does not acquire jurisdiction ultimately to decide a contro-
versy before the federal courts, but renders only an advisory opinion to the
federal judiciary.
Section 25.031 - Permissive or Mandatory
Undoubtedly, the next time the federal judiciary is confronted with an
interpretation of uncertain Florida law, and the application of abstention
is proper, it will make use of section 25.031. Is there a mandatory obligation
upon the Supreme Court of Florida to answer these certificates? This writer
thinks not. The pertinent language of section 25.031 relating to this
problem states that the federal appellate courts may certify questions of
uncertain state law to the supreme court, "which certificate the supreme
court of this state ...may answer." The word "may" seems to be of a
permissive nature.'20 This conclusion is substantiated by the recent Florida
case of Stein v. Darby, '2 wherein the Supreme Court of Florida refused
to answer a certified question which was sent to it by a Florida district
court of appeal. 2
2
Section 4(2) of article V of the Florida constitution states that the
Supreme Court of Florida
may review by certiorari any decision of a district court of appeal
that . . . passes upon a question certified by the district court of
appeal to be of great public interest, or that is in direct conflict
with a decision of another district court of appeal or of the supreme
court on the same point of law ....
The Supreme Court of Florida, in Darby, held that the word "may"
should not be construed as "shall," and that the court is not compelled to
decide certified questions.
119. Harrison v. N.A.A.C.P., 360 U.S. 167 (1959); Louisiana P. & L. Co. v. City of
Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358
U.S. 639 (1959); Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm., CIO v. Windsor,
353 U.S. 364 (1957); Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957); AFL
v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101
(1944); Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168 (1942); Williams v. Hot
Shoppes, Inc., 293 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
120. The word "may" has been held to mean "shall" and "shall" has been held to
mean "may." However, there is a presumption that the word "may" is of a permissive
nature. See, e.g., Stein v. Darby, 134 So.2d 232 (Fla. 1961).
121. 134 So.2d 232 (Fla. 1961).
122. See also, Zirin v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 128 So.2d 594, 596 (Fla. 1961); Susco
CarRental Sys. v. Leonard, 112 So.2d 832 (Fla. 1959).
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The purposes of section 25.031 and article V, section 4(2) are different.
However, there is no legitimate reason to construe the two sections differ-
ently as to their permissive nature.
VII. CONCLUSION
It seems unlikely that Congress will revoke diversity jurisdiction or
restrict the application of the abstention doctrine in the near future. There-
fore, it is highly desirable that Congress amend the Judicial Code and set
forth a standard procedure for the federal courts to follow in determining
exactly what type of cases require the application of abstention. This action
would eliminate the confusion surrounding the applicability of abstention
which prevails in the minds of the litigants, their attorneys, and the federal
judges themselves. It also would alleviate the main objection to abstention,
i.e., the lack of congressional authorization.
The Florida Legislature had rare foresight in enacting a statute which
authorized inter-sovereign certification. This procedure is used to facilitate
the application of abstention by affording a swift procedure whereby the
federal appellate courts can receive immediate answers to uncertain ques-
tions of state law through the use of certified questions sent to the Supreme
Court of Florida. However, it must be remembered that this procedure
can be used only in those cases which require the operation of abstention
and not in all cases involving issues of uncertain state law. To insure the
maximum efficiency of section 25.031, the Florida Legislature should expand
the privilege of certification to the federal district courts. It is also suggested
that the legislators in the other forty-nine states take cognizance of section
25.031 of the Florida Statutes.
12 3
It is admitted that inter-sovereign certification presents its own perplexi-
ties, but they are greatly outweighed by its elimination of some of the
primary disadvantages of the abstention doctrine.
123. The British Commonwealth, by statute (British Law Ascertainment Act, 1859,
22 & 23 Vict. c. 63), provides a procedure similar to that of section 25.031. Certified
questions may be sent by any Commonwealth court to any other Commonwealth court
when the former court is faced with a question of uncertain law of the latter jurisdiction.
The answer to these questions is mandatory. DIcEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 115 (7th ed. 1958).
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